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In the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” (“Erkenntniskritische Vorrede”) to The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama (Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels) (henceforth Vorrede), Walter Benjamin was concerned 
with the ethics of his own interpretive gesture in that the rhythm and/or relative velocity of the 
operations of critical attention that he was at pains to describe as necessary to the methodological 
procedure of philosophical criticism had an essential rapport—one could also even more pointedly 
call it a performative relation—with the interpretive content of the analysis and, hence, to the 
artwork or works under scrutiny. My reading of the Vorrede here is designed to explore the gestural 
character of Benjamin’s propaedeutic.1 Benjamin’s idea of the Baroque (and the related notion of 
allegory) in the Trauerspiel book (1928)2 concerns, I shall argue, not only movement quality in 
seventeenth-century performance, but the quality of movement of thought necessary to effectively 
shadow the perception of the “baroque” intermittency inherent to a gesturally-oriented analysis 
and hence to the analysis of baroque gesture. I shall attempt to show this through a close 
comparative reading of the German text with the English translation, as the latter elides many of 
the subtleties crucial to a gesturally oriented reading of the text. 
There is no mentality without motility and the question of movement reconstruction concerns the 
possibility that thought would capture itself in and through its affinities with its own movement. As 
Samuel Weber has said: “[W]hat Benjamin seeks to articulate in that Preface is not simply another 
form of cognitive investigation, but rather a form of interpretation that does not take cognition for 
granted” (1991, 467). If thought partakes of an ethics and aesthetics of gesture, this realization 
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affects not only the movement of bodies that we refer to as dance, but also the movement of texts 
that we refer to as writing.3 Making these two modalities interdependent could be taken from an 
academic perspective as an anti-disciplinary move in that text and gesture are generally considered 
to be cognitively disparate.4 But, beyond this, the movement in question is itself multifaceted in 
that it extends from dramaturgical movement to verse movement to stage movement and, 
ultimately, to a conception of the movement of history or how we perceive history to move on 
stage. This multifaceted conception of movement encompasses both the movement of thought as 
occasioned by an analytic methodology and the movement within the artwork itself whose 
interpretation is essential to an understanding of same. One outcome is that the gestural rhythm 
of intermittency or irregularity can be considered both as a textual gesture and a gestural text. This 
resultant interdisciplinarity unites the ethical and the aesthetic dimensions of art and its 
interpretation.  
Yet, given the subject of his study—the seventeenth-century German tragedy of mourning—the 
ethical dimension of the Vorrede overflows the performative quality of interpretation in that the 
object of interpretation itself is also ethically fraught: the gesture of tyranny and/or martyrdom of 
the baroque sovereign. For this reason, Benjamin’s methodology of a fitful and intermittent rhythm 
of interpretation begs comparison with Carl Schmitt’s discussion of the state of exception in 
Political Theology wherein the sovereign decision emanates directly from the state of exception, 
and is accordingly rendered as swift and decisive rather than fitful and ponderous. “In the 
exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid 
by repetition” (1985, 15).5 By declaring the state of exception that effectively suspends the juridical 
order, the sovereign exercises “the decision in absolute purity” (13), which is the decision liberated 
from any juridical norm. And, the first decision is to decide on the exception itself.6 As Giorgio 
Agamben has argued: “While for Schmitt the decision is the nexus that unites sovereignty and the 
state of exception, Benjamin ironically divides sovereign power from its exercise and shows that 
the baroque sovereign is constitutively incapable of deciding” (2005, 55).7  
Agamben reflects on one aspect of Benjamin’s analysis that hews to the dramaturgy of character 
in the plays, yet there are many other dramaturgical considerations that need to be accounted for. 
The Vorrede, for example, is not about the baroque sovereign, and in its intentional confusion of 
different cognitive modes it too allows life to break through “the crust of mechanism,” one that 
Benjamin characterizes as the use of the authoritative quotation habitual to the philosophical 
treatise. Agamben’s indecision could be one way to qualify or give semantic content to 
intermittency, but what is at issue in the Vorrede is the character of the interpretive gesture itself, 
which is not so much indecisive or “roundabout” as fastidious (umständlich). “Ausdauernd hebt das 
Denken stets von neuem an, umständlich geht es auf die Sache selbst zurück” (Tirelessly the 
process of thinking makes new beginnings, returning in a roundabout way to its original object) 
(Benjamin 1991, 208; 1977, 28). “Roundabout way” does not do justice to the punctilious fussiness 
of umständlich, which suggests a fastidious rather than meandering procedure. Benjamin’s 
methodology of contemplation is no more norm-governed than the action of the decisive or, for 
that matter, the indecisive sovereign.8  
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Agamben’s approach, in any case, is to pinpoint a crucial relation between Schmitt’s theorization 
of the sovereign exception and an earlier essay by Benjamin, “Critique of Violence” (1921) (in 
Benjamin 1986). “The theory of sovereignty that Schmitt develops in his Political Theology can be 
read as a precise response to Benjamin’s essay” (Agamben 2005, 54). What I wish to problematize, 
however, is the extension of Benjamin’s concept of gesture as pure violence to the larger concerns 
of interpretation implicit in baroque gesture. For, it seems to me that the violence at issue in the 
Trauerspiel book in addition to that of the tyrant and the martyr in the plays of mourning is the 
dialectical violence applied to the body as symbol or allegory, beautiful organic form or petrified 
thing: the entire attempt at interpretation is geared to the violence of this dialectic and not to the 
sovereign violence of Gerechtigkeit as in “Critique of Violence.” While Agamben makes a convincing 
argument that in Political Theology Schmitt is responding to Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” it is 
also possible that Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book, which develops a far richer and more nuanced 
thinking on gesture than does “Critique of Violence,” itself responds to Schmitt’s Political Theology. 
And, here we are faced with the difference between Schmitt’s sovereign decision as gesture and 
Benjamin’s interpretation as gesture. What the Vorrede adds to this discussion is the fact that 
gesture concerns the whole project of the Trauerspiel book as regards the interpretation of the 
Baroque, not just the comportment of the baroque monarch on the stage. For, in the analysis of 
the relation of Schmitt’s Political Theology to Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” Agamben develops 
the thinking that leads to his essay “Notes on Gesture” (2000). It is because Benjamin’s idea of 
gesture in “Critique of Violence” amounts to “violence as pure medium” that Agamben arrives at 
the idea of gesture in his later essay as itself the communication of communicability, or a means 
without end. This comes down to understanding gesture, as he puts it in State of Exception, as 
“never a means but only a manifestation” (2005, 62). What I am arguing for here is a more complex 
understanding of gesture and the ethics of gesture in Benjamin as instrumental to the 
methodology of philosophical criticism of the artwork. 
The Vorrede 
I begin with where movement can be found in Benjamin’s writing, and for this we must consult the 
original German in order to perceive certain of Benjamin’s crucial subtleties of meaning that are 
lost in translation. These concern chiefly the specificities of movement analysis that are lost to non-
German readers of the 1977 English translation The Origin of German Tragic Drama.9 The “Epistemo-
Critical Prologue” (abbreviated here to Vorrede) shall serve as the main axis of my approach to the 
Trauerspiel book. This text, although notorious for being difficult to reconcile with the book’s two 
long chapters, is actually crucial to an understanding of Benjamin’s idea of the Baroque in the 
German play of mourning, which can only be fully grasped in and as an aesthetics and ethics of 
gesture. 10  Its title in German—“Erkenntniskritische Vorrede”—suggests that the Vorrede is 
questioning (in the sense of critical of) axiomatic knowledge (erkenntniskritisch) rather than 
concerned with the critical qualities of epistemology (as epistemo-critical might suggest): it is 
critical, that is, of the disciplinary status of philosophical knowledge, which projects certitude about 
its own self-containment (Abgeschlossenheit) qua knowledge. Scientific or axiomatic knowledge 
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displays its truth in immediate and self-evident terms. Let us retain the term immediacy, which 
shall have purchase on the aesthetic categories that subsequently emerge. 
Benjamin begins with the observation that philosophy is confronted at every turn (mit jeder 
Wendung) with the question of representation (die Frage der Darstellung).11 Thought (Denken), which 
is an action of contemplation, is confronted by writing (Schrifttum), the only representational 
system through which it can be conveyed. The stakes of representation are that it be the 
representation of truth (Darstellung der Wahrheit). The form the representation of thought-as-truth 
takes, in other terms, is writing. If truth is assured by thought (as subjective contemplation), 
however, writing betrays it inasmuch as philosophy cannot reflect truth in the form of its own 
expression. What philosophy lacks is the relationship between form and content proper to art.12 
Philosophy compensates for this lack by asserting its authoritative and systematic method as 
didacticism (Lehre). Benjamin characterizes the form representation takes in philosophical 
discourse as “historical codification,” more precisely, “das autoritäre Zitat” (the authoritative 
quotation) that typifies the medieval scholastic treatise (1991, 208; 1977, 27).   
To say that thought is confronted by the question of representation at every turn, therefore, means 
that philosophy, once having given up its disciplinary pretense of unimpeachable scientific status 
(as mathesis universalis), is called upon to recognize itself as hermeneutic rather than foundational. 
It is, in other terms, called upon to recognize its fragmented rather than totalizing character. 
Writing cannot transform the act of thinking into authoritative knowledge for the very reason that 
writing shares the structure—I would almost prefer to say the conduct—of contemplation. The 
experience of contemplation cannot present itself mimetically in writing because contemplation 
itself does not have a presentational or mimetic structure.13 What this means is that philosophy 
has misconstrued its own method, which, when correctly understood, is that of art as an object 
presenting itself for contemplation.14 Benjamin arrives, in this way, at his notion of philosophical 
criticism.15 The problem of thinking and writing—the reason why thinking is always “confronted 
with” representation—is that it cannot present itself in terms of its own experience as temporalized 
subjective awareness. Here, we reach Benjamin’s first important conclusion: the very method of 
philosophical criticism is Umweg, a term translated into English by digression (1991, 208; 1977, 28), 
but which might better be translated according to its literal meaning—way around or detour. 
Definitive for representation as a method is detour (Darstellung als Umweg). Detour can be neither 
authoritative nor systematic. As discussed above with regard to the interpretative gesture, it 
pertains to digression and its quality is umständlich: fussy or fastidious, because taking exception 
with itself rather than pursuing an inevitable forward movement. 
This begs the question: What is the form of thought once we accept that our access to it takes place 
exclusively through writing, and more specifically through the intermediary of a literary genre? The 
form of thought that is palpable in its scriptural building block is the sentence. Where does the 
sentence rejoin the very process of thought from which it issues? By imposing a series of halts, the 
sentence creates a series of pauses and recommencements: “[A] writer must stop and restart with 
every new sentence” (1977, 29). The sentence presupposes a rhythm of thought. It is worth noting 
that in German, the subject is not the writer, but writing itself: “[I]st es der Schrift eigen [it is proper 
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to writing itself], mit jedem Satze von neuem einzuhalten und anzuheben” (1991, 209). It is, in other 
terms, the property of the prose form—writing (Schrift)—to stop and start, a procedure whose 
structural necessity is vouchsafed by the sentence itself. The pause at the end of the sentence, like 
the pause at the expiration of breath, creates a terminus or temporary halt in consequence of 
which thought is then set moving in a new direction: it is fundamentally discontinuous and, in this 
sense too, umständlich. “The continual pausing for breath is the mode most proper to the process 
of contemplation” (1991, 208; 1977, 28). 
The pausing for breath (Atemholen) determines the very conduct of the sentence: its limited 
duration, termination, and new beginning. Benjamin attributes an uneven rhythm to sentences as 
determined by the very temporality of contemplation (die eigenste Daseinsform der Kontemplation) 
they impose by virtue of their interruptiveness. “The mode most proper to the process of 
contemplation,” as the English translation renders it, omits Daseinsform (1991, 208): form of being 
there (Dasein) of contemplation. Contemplation lives in the sequentiality of breathing. The form 
taken by contemplation as linguistic expression (a series of punctuated sentences) is dictated by 
its very existence in time as part of life process. Since it always encounters its own death in and as 
expired breath it cannot embody vitality. Here we acquire a deeper understanding of detour as 
method because it occurs through time as the intermittent rhythm of sentences: beginnings may 
be slow; maximum speeds are interrupted. With the emphasis placed on starting over, getting 
distracted, returning to, but differently…. the time-based quality of perception and thought 
emerges. “For by pursuing different levels of meaning in its examination of one single object it 
receives both the incentive (Antrieb) to begin anew, and the justification for its irregular rhythm” 
(intermittierenden Rhythmik). 
Once the term “irregular rhythm,” is proffered the metaphor of the artwork as mosaic makes its 
appearance in the text: “Just as mosaics preserve their majesty despite their fragmentation to 
capricious particles, so philosophical contemplation is not lacking in momentum [Schwung]” (1991, 
208; 1977, 28). With the metaphor of the mosaic the grammatical and physiological are detoured, 
as it were, into the visual. Detour is also motivated by interpretation, that is, by the complexity of 
issues that arise in interpretation such that a linear path cannot be forged through the artwork 
and the attendant observation necessitating the renewed return to the object of contemplation. 
The mosaic itself embodies the formal qualities that oblige its contemplation to proceed 
fragmentarily, so to speak. “Both [the mosaic and contemplation] are made up of the distant and 
the disparate” (1991, 208; 1977, 28). Part of interpretation is responsive to the form of writing itself; 
part is responsive to the visual structure of the artwork. The notion of detail and fragment is 
essential to both subject and object, if I may put it thus. “The value of fragments of thought is all 
the greater the less direct their relationship to the underlying idea.” And: “[T]ruth-content is only 
to be grasped through immersion in the most minute details of subject matter” (1991, 208; 1977, 
29). It is precisely at this moment in the text that the necessity to observe—or rather, to 
contemplate—the object merges with the will to fragment it: to regard it as in pieces, or to segment 
it. 16  The notion of the artwork is here transported into a corresponding temporality of 
contemplative conduct. And, this necessity is in itself double. It arises because our vision cannot 
take in the totality, which instead presents itself as a mosaic; but also, because language itself 
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cannot flow uninterruptedly. Hence, thought itself takes on the form (movement and rhythm) of 
contemplation that is wholly adequate to its own representation in writing. 
Benjamin adds that contemplation does not lack impetus. However, Schwung is translated with the 
English term momentum, which suggests the potential for acceleration is assumed, whereas this 
is quite the opposite of his meaning as I understand it.17 Contemplation contradicts the idea of 
gathering momentum. The very irregularity of movement that Benjamin repeatedly evokes refers 
to a periodic suspension within movement.18 Momentum, for its part, is more typical of articulated 
language and pantomime (“voice and gesture”) than it is of writing, and it inevitably leads to a false 
synthesis. The formal inter-implication of breathing and writing, one within the other, yields 
“ideas:” “Truth, bodied forth in the dance (Reigen) of represented ideas, resists being projected, by 
whatever means, into the realm of knowledge” (1991, 209; 1977, 29). The term for dance used in 
the German is Reigen, which suggests the circular patterns of cosmic dance and foreshadows the 
notion of constellation in Benjamin’s thought. 19  Here, a relation emerges between ideas, in 
Benjamin’s particular sense of the term, and dance; a relation that will be further evidenced in the 
term choreography in what follows. 
We thus return to the title of the Vorrede in which knowledge (Erkenntnis) is criticized for privileging 
the concept (Begriff) to the detriment of the idea (Idee). It is almost as if with Benjamin one comes 
into contact with the idea phenomenologically—on the basis, that is, of the formal congruence 
between breathing, grammatical sentence structure, and artwork as mosaic. This congruence in 
the gestural components of contemplative and hence hermeneutic method constitutes the ethical 
quality of interpretive conduct. The concept is from this perspective a possession (ein Haben) of 
consciousness (and hence transcendental) whereas the idea cannot be possessed: it exists in its 
fragmentary state to be contemplated inasmuch as it hews to the object and to the complementary 
form of perception of the object. The idea is part of the world and, as fragment of itself, it is the 
relic of a world past. This sense of the fragment as physical part of the past-real is what lends the 
fragment its truth status, in Benjaminian terms, as inseparable from its very materiality. 
Philosophical truth is manifest only in “the formal elements of the preserved work of art” as 
epitomized by the ruin, which comes to replace the mosaic in the main body of the text as a key 
allegorical term for the object of contemplation.  
In the process of these opening pages Benjamin performs the movement between ideas—
representation, breathing, sentence, fragment, mosaic, idea—that make the point of confluence 
between writing, research, perception, and thought palpable as a movement of thought and as a 
textual movement. The movement between these terms shows us how movement moves 
allegorically. This serves in turn to underline the importance of allegory as a keyword for the 
Trauerspiel book since in allegory there is no formal transcendent term but only a sequence of 
substitutions. “The false appearance of totality is extinguished” (1991, 352; 1977, 176). Writing is 
productive of the idea as thought-fragment and allegory demands contemplation because its 
interpretation is necessarily time consuming: neither instinctive nor momentary, it is always 
mediated in the sense of subject to intermittence.  
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Symbol/Allegory 
If allegory displays the temporality of ethical contemplation of the artwork, this is specific to the 
play of mourning as the object of analysis of the Trauerspiel book. Herein lies an opportunity to 
establish a relation between what I believe Benjamin is about in the Vorrede and how he deals with 
the distinction between symbol and allegory in the Chapter “Allegory and Trauerspiel.” The contrast 
in temporalities between the symbol and the allegory could not be more evident, and returns us 
to the differences between the concept and the idea as discussed in the Vorrede and to the 
difference between the swiftness of the decision in Schmitt and the halting rhythm of 
contemplation and interpretation in Benjamin. The symbol is immediate—“‘a momentary 
totality’”—whereas allegory is “‘progression in a series of moments’” (1991, 341; 1977, 165). 
Benjamin’s symbol-allegory pair seems inspired at least in part by the dialectical relationship of 
Apollo and Dionysus in Nietzsche. Symbol and allegory are in a dialectical relation in that each 
presupposes a relation between the visual and meaning that is not entirely dichotomous with the 
other. In the symbol, meaning is “contained within,” whereas allegory unleashes depths that 
separate the visual being from immediate meaning through the depth that is proper to it as well:  
The measure of time for the experience of the symbol is the mystical instant in 
which the symbol assumes the meaning into its hidden, and if one might say so, 
wooded interior. (1991, 342; 1977, 165) 
The temporality of the symbol is “the mystical instant” inasmuch as the immediacy of the symbol 
imposes a condensation of experience that suggests the inexpressible or sublime. What prevents 
its retreat into obscurantism, however, is “the organic, mountain and plant-like quality in the 
makeup of the symbol” (1991, 342; 1977, 165). In other terms, the symbol “adapts itself to natural 
forms, penetrates and animates them” (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff cited by Benjamin, 1991, 341; 
1977, 164). In sum, “[T]he artistic symbol is plastic,” (1991, 341; 1977, 164), which is how the symbol 
reconciles plastic form with the inexpressible quality of the “mystical symbol.” The instant is 
transformed into a quickening whose consequences can be observed in the natural world of forms. 
Benjamin refers to Winckelmann and evokes Greco-Roman figure sculpture in allying the symbol 
with classicism. In this sense, the mystical temporality of the symbol condenses into a sparkling 
present of the beautiful human form. 
But, allegory, too, is dialectically split: 
[A]llegory is not free from a corresponding dialectic, and the contemplative calm 
with which it immerses itself into the depths which separate visual being from 
meaning, has none of the disinterested self-sufficiency which is present in the 
apparently related intention of the sign. (1991, 342; 1977, 165–166)  
If the written sign (Zeichen) also benefits from a condensation of meaning, Benjamin recognizes 
the dangers of ascribing to writing itself (Schrifttum) the allegorical temporality of interpretation. It 
is here that an important qualitative shift occurs in which the idea of form extends itself to a theory 
of genre: in this case, the drama of mourning itself, which deploys narrative temporality. “The 
 
99 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 3 (1) (2017) 
violence of the dialectical movement within these allegorical depths” (1991, 342; 1977, 166) is made 
clearer not only by resorting to the way genre reorients the use of language with respect to the 
visual, but also by virtue of a transition toward one of Benjamin’s most elusive concepts, that of 
natural history or the “strange combination [Verschränkung] of nature and history [through which] 
[…] the allegorical mode of expression is born” (1991, 344; 1977, 167). In the German, Verschränkung 
(crossing) has a more dialectical ring than combination. The drama of this crossing between nature 
and history is, like the violence of the dialectic perpetrated on the body by the symbol/allegory 
dialectic, productive of allegory itself inasmuch as the latter calls forth a specific interpretative 
methodology that frees itself from timeworn academic authority.  
Beatrice Hanssen refers to the contradictory meanings of natural history in the Vorrede: “In the 
course of the investigation, natural history could either signal the temporality of transience or, 
quite to the contrary, refer to the dehistoricizing tendency that marked baroque drama,” she 
writes. For Hanssen, “in turning to natural history the mourning play brought about a spatialization 
(and hence de-historicization) of history – a dynamic Benjamin captured by what he called the 
‘setting-to-stage’ of history” (1998, 50). I would disagree that spatialization in a discussion of 
dramaturgy can be interpreted as de-historicizing, particularly because spatialization is closely 
linked to choreography as a means to undercut the sense of forward motion implicit in Aristotelian 
verisimilitude.20 But, as with the particular sense of rhythm set forth in the Vorrede, space too is 
not without rhythm and movement. It is the very presence of the stage prop—the main 
‘protagonist’ of the setting—in its palpable physical presence on stage that allows us to perceive 
what transpires there less as a symbolic allusion to life based on organic metaphor than as a reality 
whose import is palpably historical on the very basis of its dehumanization, its necessity to endure 
beyond the narrative limits of life expectancy as ruin. 21  Here too, if we read Benjamin’s 
philosophical aesthetics of dramaturgy in the light of the symbol/allegory distinction and attend to 
the temporalities implied by these categories, we note that the symbol—which is plastic form or 
mimesis par excellence—is characterized as “a momentary totality,” whereas in allegory “we have 
progression in a series of moments” (1991, 341; 1977, 165). Where the present is insisted upon, as 
in theatrical representation, allegory cannot be bereft of temporality and hence of historicity. The 
point is that this temporality is secular. “For where it is a question of a realization in terms of space 
– and what else is meant by its secularization other than its transformation into the strictly present 
– then the most radical procedure is to make events simultaneous” (1991, 370; 1977, 194). The 
simultaneity of the performative event and the historical event confers a re-enactive logic on 
theater. 22  So, Benjamin also writes: “History is secularized in the setting […] chronological 
movement is grasped and analyzed in a spatial image” (1991, 271; 1977, 92). I would understand 
the secularization of history as a rejection of a theological notion of political power (see Franko 
2007). This is, of course, what Benjamin so ruthlessly exposes in “Critique of Violence.” Also worthy 
of note here is Benjamin’s insistence that the setting and the court are one and the same: “For the 
court is the setting par excellence” (1991, 271; 1977, 92). In other terms, the court is always 
theatrical and hence a socially determined form of self-representation. As a milieu, therefore, the 
court has no recourse to a theological or spiritual dimension. The setting is history concretized on 
the stage as an event simultaneous with the present as self-presentation and self-representation—
hence a site of intrigue—and not a theologically symbolic site.23 By the same token, as Weber 
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points out, it is also not the space of the sovereign exception: “The state of exception is excluded 
as theater” (1992, 17).  
History as Setting, Prop, and Sign(language) 
Benjamin describes allegory in its essential relationship to human life and human history. Here, 
history refers not to official history of the body politic: “This is the heart of the allegorical way of 
seeing, of the Baroque, secular explanation of history as the Passion of the world” (Das ist der Kern 
der allegorischen Betrachtung, der barocken: weltliche Exposition der Geschichte als 
Leidensgeschichte der Welt) (1991, 343; 1977, 166). “The Passion of the world” (as rendered in 
English) tends toward a ‘symbolic’ representation of suffering—a “general concept” more in line 
with allegory (1991, 341; 1977, 164)24—whereas, in the German, the secular quality of suffering is 
underlined quite starkly as “history of suffering.” As such, it relates to the “biographical historicity 
of the individual” as well as the riddle of human suffering (1991, 343; 1977, 166). Here, the presence 
of death is emphasized as the condition of meaning— “The greater the significance, the greater 
the subjection to death, because death digs most deeply the jagged line of demarcation between 
physical nature and significance” (1991, 343; 1977 166). Death is the corollary of breathing as 
contemplation’s condition of possibility. With the presence of the phenomenon of death we have 
the clearest indication of what demarcates history from what Benjamin calls natural history. It is 
because “nature has always been subject to the power of death” that its significance is historical in 
a secular sense that differentiates, precisely, in a theatrical sense, classical tragedy from the play 
of mourning. Benjamin’s use of the term symbol resonates with Kantorowicz’s use of the term body 
politic in the context of history. Whereas the body politic is undying, the physical death of the body 
of the king must be qualified as abject and hence as belonging to the transitory aspect of life: 
devoid of a symbolic position within remembrance. History is, in this connection, the history of the 
body politic—“the process of an eternal life,” (1991, 353; 1977, 178) which is the life of power—not 
that of the body natural, in Kantorowicz’s terms. But, Benjamin is not speaking here of a symbolic 
political death that confirms the continuity of power throughout history, but of the death of the 
body natural: the unrecorded suffering in/of history (Leidensgeschichte) and the fact of mortality 
and decay (Vergänglichkeit).  
To explore the tension between nature and history, Benjamin attends to the qualities of space 
rather than to movement. Herein lies the connection between the stage prop and the ruin because 
in both temporality is captured within the spatial. The landscape in its relationship to a stage- 
setting becomes the scene of a dialectical encounter between history and nature or natural history: 
Whereas in the symbol destruction is idealized and the transfigured face of nature 
is fleetingly revealed in the light of redemption, in allegory the observer is 
confronted by the facies hippocratica of history as a petrified, primordial landscape. 
(1991, 343; 1977, 166)  
The petrified landscape will become the locus and, actually, the visible scene of dialectical exchange 
between symbol and allegory, history and nature. Landscape as scene of this encounter is the ideal 
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locus for such an exchange both because of its theatrical potential as setting and because of its 
ability to expose culture to nature in the figure of the ruin. “For when nature bears the imprint of 
history, that is to say, where it is a setting (Schauplatz) does it not have a numismatic quality?” (1991, 
349; 1977, 173). The staged representation of nature is itself paradigmatic of an attempt to impose 
(as if to imprint or emboss) symbolic and therefore redemptive meaning upon the inhuman course 
of history, one that cannot be reconciled with classical historical discourse. Its stamping or imprint 
as coin of the realm (its numismatic quality) underlines its political teleology. History clings to one 
of the fundamental forms of theatrical representation—the décor—even if the décor is a “natural” 
one in that it is fortuitously placed in nature. 
The arbitrary quality of allegorical meaning does not lend specificity to the representation of nature 
because it endows nature with a force whose only meaning can be derived from the imprint of 
history upon it. Here, the role of writing (now referred to as script in the English), in its hieroglyphic 
sense combining writing with image, is to inscribe meaning upon it, hence its numismatic quality, 
which gives us nature (the landscape) as stage setting. And hence, the tragedy of mourning itself 
is a symbol of allegorical interpretation inasmuch as it transpires within a setting where the theory 
of allegory can be manifested as dialectic between history and nature.  
But, in the quasi-natural setting history is, nonetheless, defeated. “The transfixed face of signifying 
nature is victorious, and history must, once and for all, remain contained in the subordinate role 
of stage-property” (1991, 347; 1977, 171). Since history and the symbolic register are responsible 
for the illusion of plasticity and ephemeral humanity as protagonists in the setting, to relegate 
history to the category of the prop is truly to make of history an object rather than an organic body. 
It is for this reason Benjamin later says there are strictly speaking no actual characters in the genre 
of Trauerspiel, only things.25 The word Requisit—stage prop—reduces the function of history within 
nature to an element within the setting. As with certain of de Chirico’s images of furniture 
seemingly abandoned in a natural landscape where they are washed away by a flood, history is 
reduced to a prop, its events “shrivel up and become absorbed in the setting” (1991, 355; 1977, 
179). History itself is a stage set inundated by the forces of nature, a mere representation to be 
swept away. The stage property/setting quality of history when confronted with the eventfulness 
of nature presents itself in the tragedy of mourning as writing (Schrift): “The word ‘history’ stands 
written on the countenance of nature in the characters of transience” (1991, 353; 1977, 177). The 
allegory of history as prop is “transient” writing (Zeichenschrift): writing as a sign or gesture—as 
related to sign language, but not to the theatrical script. French ballet à entrées of the early 
seventeenth century also deployed the body as both decor and writing (see Franko 2015). 
No sooner has the stage setting become Schrift (as distinguished from Schrifttum) than the scene 
of the ruin as a device with which to stage the dialectic relation between nature and history 
becomes clear: “The allegorical physiognomy of the nature-history, which is put on stage in the 
Trauerspiel is present in reality in the form of the ruin” (1991, 353; 1977, 177). The ruin, in other 
terms, is history subject to and subjected to the force of nature. Put otherwise, the ruin is itself the 
theatrical setting where we see history as staged in nature: “In the ruin, history has physically 
merged into the setting” (1991, 353; 1977, 178). For history to be staged is for it to become a theater 
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of objects. The consequence is that we cannot read nature directly as with the momentary 
appearance of the symbol: we read nature indirectly through history as prop.  
The image of the ruin is the ultimate expression of allegory, whose detail or motif is the fragment.26 
Benjamin explains theater with the visual allegory of the image, but brings the two series together 
when he writes: “Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things” 
(1991, 354; 1977, 178). Allegory absorbs history within its own ruination. Philosophical criticism can 
obtain a truth-value not as logos, but by becoming a thought-thing, a Gedanken-Ding. Such a thing 
undermines the momentum of history. 
The irregular rhythm of Benjamin’s analysis is the result of the superimposition of two critical 
operations. A dialectical operation through which allegory and symbol are in a superimposed 
tension because each is found to be perceptible within the other while also being bound in a 
struggle containing a political dimension; and, a more properly allegorical operation in which 
meaning is manifested in the slippage or metonymical movement between terms that occurs as if 
by association or analogy. It is this superimposition of the paradigmatic axis of the dialectic onto 
the syntagmatic axis of the trace that produces a poetics of Trauerspiel that tends toward 
immobility. Here it would seem fitting that Trauerspiel itself evidences the very rhythm of the 
contemplation required to interpret it: “The Trauerspiel is therefore in no way characterized by 
immobility, nor indeed by slowness of action […] but by the irregular rhythm of the constant pause, 
the sudden change of direction, and consolidation into new rigidity” (1991, 373; 1977, 197).27 These 
are the very descriptive terms, or can be seen to constitute the descriptive system, of 
contemplation as discussed in the Vorrede. 
In this extension of interpretation into the artwork the role of contemplation is relayed to that of 
choreography. Benjamin attributes the tendency toward stasis in the slowing down of the action 
of the play of mourning to choreography as image: “[C]hronological movement is grasped and 
analyzed in a spatial image” (1991, 271; 1977, 92). It is as if all the threads of the analysis thus far 
converge in the theatrical representation of the court, which is at once verbal and visual. These are 
depths that contain a certain violence, but not the violence of pure mediality or of the gestural 
manifestation as Agamben would have it. The depths are dialectical and they affect the human 
body above all. As mentioned above, the court itself is a theatrical entity, one that is self-
representing in that it is self-theatricalizing. In Benjamin’s language the sense of setting and image 
merge here as an encounter between thought and representation that underlines the concordance 
between what is analyzed and how it is analyzed as discussed apropos of the Vorrede. In this case, 
however, the way history merges into the setting brings choreographic space into being, a space 
that is the prime modality of expression of the court itself. “The image of the setting, or more 
precisely, of the court is the setting par excellence” (1977, 92). The setting is a set of spatial 
relationships that can be read. The German reads: “der innerste Schauplatz” (the most inward of 
showplaces) (1991, 271) implying thereby that the proverbial superficiality and show of the court—
the court in its constitutive theatricality—has, in actuality, its own “wooded interior” or subjective 
reason for being. The expressive quality of the court is none other than “the spatial continuum, 
which one might describe as choreographic” (1991, 274; 1977, 95). Hence, the notion of writing as 
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representation that was earlier identified as containing within its own rhythms the conduct of 
contemplation as itself an ethical methodology, is elaborated upon in the Trauerspiel book as 
choreographic and presented in spatial terms in the third chapter as an attribute of Trauerspiel 
itself. The dialectic of history and nature becomes theater as choreography: where nature takes 
over for history, choreography takes over for theater, movement takes over for words. More 
precisely, the role of movement and visual pattern in what would otherwise be a theater of the 
word signals not just the influence of (court) ballet as such but the becoming nature of history, the 
secularization of what might otherwise too easily appear as the outcome of myth or fate. It is in 
the spatial accent of choreography where the court as setting becomes the expressive material of 
theater that the historical past can be viewed as a natural phenomenon, that is, as a phenomenon 
destined to mortality and corruption, “the stations of decline” (1991, 343; 1977, 166). This being is, 
somewhat counter-intuitively, likened to an object theater. 
A vertiginous accumulation of terms of substitution in a dispersed series counterbalances the 
formulations of the dialectic. This is another form of the manipulation of (discursive) space 
Benjamin calls choreographic. The space of discourse qua space is one in which the dialectic can 
be used as a spatial choice in willful juxtaposition to metonomy. The discursive outcome of the 
dialectic history/nature is the gradual reification of the terms locked in struggle and their 
consequent tendency to be reshuffled on the horizontal playing board of analogy and substitution. 
To the becoming fragment of the totality and the becoming thing of the person is added the 
becoming space of the court and the becoming court of the setting. Fragment, thing, space, court, 
setting—all avatars of the timeless rebirth of the truth in the fragment—are the very conditions of 
the return of the unrealized as mourned. Benjamin’s understanding of allegory as Baroque is not 
a period concept but, as I have argued, the fundamental propaedeutic of philosophical criticism. 
In the body of the Trauerspiel book, Benjamin’s concern for the rhythm of contemplation as 
explored in the Vorrede migrates to the temporality of allegory and the role of choreography in the 
spatialization of the theater scene as historical. This, I would like to suggest, is the most proper 
realm of gesture, which assumes at once a temporal and a spatial presence through its 
choreographic complexity as a movement-object. In this way, the contemplative gesture is seen to 
exist in the staging of the play of mourning as a choreographic principle. 
Conclusion 
What I hope to have shown in the foregoing analysis is that Benjamin positions gesture in the 
Vorrede as an act that opens up time within space and space within time. This is most evident in 
the playful and sometimes confounding exchanges between history, nature and setting. The 
representation of organic form is taken to be a spiritualizing tendency that, as in “Critique of 
Violence,” conceals its law-making functions beneath an aura of inevitability. This also means that 
gesture can be understood as an act existing between visuality and textuality, an act, in other 
words, that is able to think itself in and through its own movement. In this sense, then, gesture in 
the broader sense cannot be understood as a “manifestation.” The dichotomy between action and 
interpretation in gesture effectively dissolves, and consequently any gestural “manifestation” 
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becomes caught up in reflection. While Agamben’s gesture as the communication of 
communicability would presumably be instantaneous and swift—like the manifestation of the 
sovereign decision itself or like the instantaneousness of the symbol as distinct from the slow 
temporality of allegory—the ethical gesturality that emerges as method in the Vorrede is founded 
on a rejection of any “purity” of gesture because said purity must by definition remain inaccessible 
to a hermeneutics. Benjamin’s treatment of gesture as a spatio-temporal phenomenon at once of 
interpretation and of dramaturgy thus begs attention for its relation to space and time as 
operations of theater and methodology at one and the same time. 
1 As such, it differs from a recent study (Newman 2017) of the Vorrede as deeply engaged with contemporary 
interlocutors on the national significance of the historical Baroque to German national identity. 
2 Interest in Benjamin’s import for dance theory is relatively recent in dance scholarship (see Ruprecht 2015). 
3I argue elsewhere that this transfer between text and gesture is constitutive of the Baroque as a twentieth-century 
phenomenon in dance (see Franko 2017; see also Franko 2016). 
4 For a recent exception to this generally held assumption, see Saussy (2016). 
5 I am grateful to my graduate student Amanda DiLodovico for having pinpointed the significance of this gestural 
distinction with ramifications for the distinction between ableism and disablement in historical political theory. 
6 “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 1985, 5). 
7 On Benjamin and Schmitt, see Weber (1992) and Bredekamp (2017). Bredekamp examines in depth the postwar 
fallout from Benjamin’s admiring letter to Schmitt in 1930. Bredecamp nonetheless pursues a line of 
argumentation based on textual analysis as he concludes: “The explanation need be sought on a level that is 
located beyond the limits of historical circumstances” (686).  
8 As Weber puts it: “Benjamin encounters the question of sovereignty not simply as a theme of German baroque 
theater, but as a methodological and theoretical problem: […] according to Benjamin every attempt to interpret 
the German baroque risks succumbing to a certain lack of sovereignty” (1992, 6). 
9 A discussion of the French translation, Origine du Drame Baroque Allemand, by Sibylle Muller (1985), exceeds the 
space available here. 
10 In the following analysis I see Benjamin’s discussion as more than, in Rainer Nägele’s terms, a question of 
philosophical versus literary discourse. The “kind of staccato [that] seems to be indicated” (1991, xvi-xvii) is not just 
a question of philosophical and literary discourse, it is a question of the procedures of contemplation necessary 
to interpretation and the physical and rhythmic processes these procedures demand of the subject.  
11 The French translation tells us philosophy is ceaselessly confronted with the problem of presentation rather 
than representation: “[…] confrontée à la question de la présentation” (23). “Darstellung,” of course, can mean 
presentation, as in theatrical presentation, but the subject of the sentence is the limits encountered by thought in 
its representation in and as writing. The French translation runs the risk of conflating the meanings of 
representation and presentation. The danger of the translation of the Vorrede is repeatedly to move precipitously 
toward a synthesis of ideas. 
12 In the Goethe quote at the start of the Vorrede, art is understood not globally but in “every individual object” 
(1977, 27) or “jedem einzelnen Behandelten” (1991, 207), which attributes to art an always already fragmented 
being. 
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13 We find ourselves here in a very Derridean realization that thought has the structure of writing. 
14 But, not any art object: an art object, such as the mosaic, which is always already determined by its fragmented 
qualities as paradigmatic of art. In fact, as we shall see, the mosaic is exemplary of the art object inasmuch as it 
subjects itself to contemplation. 
15 Philosophical criticism presupposes that the philosophical status of the work of art emerges on the basis of the 
demonstration of the artworks “ruined” status. The force of the term truth for Benjamin inheres in the notion of a 
power to return: “the basis for a rebirth” (1977, 182). In this sense, the Baroque itself does not return, the Baroque 
is rather a method of philosophical criticism. 
16 This is precisely what Benjamin will do to his object of study—the play of mourning—which he does not treat as 
a genre in the literary-critical tradition he opposes. 
17 “Philosophical contemplation is not lacking in momentum” (1977, 28). 
18 This movement aesthetic was theorized in the Italian Renaissance as fantasmata (see Franko 1987). 
19 Since classical and Christian antiquity, the cosmic dance is depicted as a round dance (see Miller 1986). 
20 Here a reference could easily be made to the differences between tragedy and the history play in Shakespeare, 
for example; and, to the relation of the history play to Brecht’s epic theater, which Benjamin also wrote about. 
21 See Benjamin’s references to the “primacy of the thing over the personal” (1991, 362; 1977, 187). 
22 See Franko (2017a). 
23 “In the process of decay, and in it alone, the events of history shrivel up and become absorbed in the setting” 
(1991, 355; 1977, 179). 
24 Hence, it relates to “’symbolic’ freedom of expression” and “classical proportion” (1991, 343; 1977, 166) and in 
this way we can see how the translation does betray the meaning of the text by translating it into symbolical rather 
than allegorical terms. 
25 “Allegorical personification has always concealed the fact that its function is not the personification of things, 
but rather to give the concrete a more imposing form by getting it up as a person” (1991, 362-3; 1977, 187). On 
the same page, Benjamin speaks of “the primacy of the thing over the personal” as parallel to “the primacy of the 
fragment over the totality.” The fragmented body is the person become thing, and the sculptural fragment—akin 
to the ruin – becomes the model for the dramatis personae of mourning plays. Here, the very persistence of the 
person is tantamount to the figuration of the symbol as an organic totality. The presence of the person on stage 
is a priori symbolic—which leads us to see how the modernist interest in the dehumanization of the actor in 
theorists such as Kleist and Craig is fundamentally baroque. See Franko (1989). 
26 In the same year Benjamin’s thesis appeared in print, Jean Cocteau published a study of Georgio de Chirico in 
Le Mystère Laïc: Essai d’étude indirecte (1928), translated into English by Arno Karlen as “The Secular Mystery: Essay 
in Indirect Criticism.”  
27 The German adjective rendered in English by “rigidity” is “erstarrt,” which is also used for the frozen face of 
allegory (Erstarrtes Antlitz). 
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